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Abstract
The effects  of globalization on  income distribution  in  author finds some evidence that at very low average
rich and poor countries are a matter of controversy.  income  levels, it is the rich who benefit from openness.
While  international trade theory  in its most abstract  As income  levels rise to those of countries such as Chile,
formulation implies that increased  trade and foreign  Colombia, or Czech Republic,  for example, the situation
investment should make income  distribution  more equal  changes,  and it is the relative income  of the poor and the
in poor countries and less equal  in rich  countries, finding  middle  class that rises compared  with the rich. It seems
these effects  has proved elusive.  Milanovic  presents  that openness makes income distribution worse before
another attempt to discern the  effects of globalization  by  making  it better-or differently  in that the effect of
using data  from household budget surveys  and looking at  openness on a  country's income distribution depends on
the impact of openness  and foreign direct investment  on  the country's  initial income level.
relative income shares of low and high deciles.  The
This paper-a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study
the effects of globalization. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "World
Income  Distribution"  (RPO 684-84).  Copies  of this paper are  available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contactPatriciaSader, room MC3-556, telephone 202-473-3902, fax 202-522-1153, email
address psader@worldbank.org.  Policy ResearchWorkingPapers are also posted on theWeb athttp://econ.worldbank.org.
The author  may be contacted  at bmilanovic@worldbank.org.  August 2002.  (22 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and  conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Ba,ik, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the Research  Advisory  StaffCAN WE DISCERN THE EFFECT OF
GLOBALIZATION  ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION?
Evidence from Household  Budget Surveys
Branko Milanovic (DEC) l
Keywords:  income distribution, inequality, globalization
JEL classification:  D3 1, F15,  13.
' I am grateful  to Prem Sangraula for excellent research assistance.  The paper was written as a continuation of the
Research Project 684-84 financed by the World Bank Research Grant.1. Introduction
The issues of globalization and income inequality have during the last ten years received  a
huge attention.  Most of it, however,  was concentrated  on the effects of globalization on within-
country  developed  countries  inequality.  In  other  words,  the  discussion  was  mostly  on  how
globalization  is (or might) affect  wage and  income  inequality  in the United  States  or Western
Europe  (e.g.  Slaughter  and  Swagel,  1997;  Dluhosch,  1998;  Schott,  1999;  Lejour  and  Tang,
1999).  The  second  strand of research was  concentrated  on how globalization  might  affect  the
distribution  of between-countries'  GDPs  per capita  by leading  to  the  differences  in mean  per
capita growth rates between the countries.
None  of  these  two  approaches  looked  at  how  globalization  affects  within-country
distribution among the less developed economies.  What discussion there was concentrated on the
effects of  globalization on LDC's growth and technology transfer  (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp,
1999)  or  the  theoretical  models  of  income  distribution  (e.g.  Wood,  1998:  Benarroch  and
Gaisford,  1996),  not on any empirical  assessment.  There  are exceptions  however.  Hanson and
Harrison (1999), Robertson (2000)  study wage inequality in the wake of Mexican  trade reforms;
Beyer,  Rohas  and Vergara  (1999)  look  at  the  similar issue  in the  context  of China;  Arbache
(1999)  studies the effect of market liberalization on inter-sectoral wage dispersion in Brazil.  The
objective  of this  paper  is  to  put  some  "empirical  meat"  on how  globalization  affects  income
distribution  in  both  less  developed  and  advanced  countries  and  to  do  this  using  the  newly
developed data base created  in the context  of the work on world  income distribution and  using
household survey data.  The advantages of the new data base are twofold:  (i) it is entirely based
on national  household  surveys  around two  benchmark  years  (1988  and  1993),  so  that income
inequality  statistics  are  almost  fuilly mutually comparable;  (ii) it  gives  not one  or two  income
inequality  measure  (say,  Gini  coefficient  or Theil index)  but the actual  data  on income  levels
across  ten  deciles  of income  distribution.  This  ability to  look  at what  is  happening  behind  a
change  in one summary statistic,  like the Gini, is crucial if we want to get a better grasp on how
globalization* affects  the  entire  distribution.  We  shall  try to  gauge  the  effects  of globalization
from how the overall  shape of income distribution  changes (income at  different  decile levels),
rather than from a simple calculation of what happens to the Gini coefficient.
The  paper  has  two  aims:  first,  to  document  changes  in the  variables  thought  to  reflect
globalization  over the  last  15  years,  and second,  to try to  link  them  to the  changes  in income
distribution.
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section  1, I look at the definition of globalization and
what could be the channels through which it might affect income distribution.  I also review some
recent work on  the issues of globalization and inequality. In Section 2, I propose a simply model
how  globalization  effects  can  affect  income  distribution.  Section  3 presents  the  descriptive
statistics on globalization  variables since  1985.  Section 4 tries to determine if the globalization
variables can be shown to affect the shape of income distribution in both poor and rich countries.
22. What it means to be "globalized"?
It  is  sometimes  useful  to  begin  with  the  official  definition.  The  official  World  Bank
definition of globalization is "Freedom  and ability of individuals  and firms to initiate voluntary
economic  transactions  with residents  of other  countries".  Empirically  globalization  translates
into greater mobility of the factors of production (capital and labor) and greater world integration
through  increased  trade  and  foreign  investments-both  direct  and  portfolio.  Several  recent
papers  that compare the two  globalization  waves,  the  one at the  end of the  last century up to
1914, and the current one look precisely at these indicators  [see Bordo, Eichengreen,  and  hrwin
(1999), Jeffrey Williamson (1996),  Craft (2000), Baldwin  and Martin (1999)]:  how much trade
there is now (as the  share of world  GDP) compared to a century ago, how much direct foreign
investment,  and  portfolio  investment,  and  how  easy  is  it  for  people  to  move  or  to  settle  in
different countries.  The studies come with a mixed verdict on the past vs.  current globalization.
Trade as share of world GDP is about the same now as then, portfolio investment  and ability to
travel  are  greater  now,  but  direct  foreign investment  and  ability to  resettle  elsewhere  are less.
Thus,  it appears  that both labor and  capital  are  in  some  sense more  and less mobile  than they
were  a century  ago,  and that  trade  is about  as important then as now. However,  our objective
here is to look at how thus defined  and empirically understood  globalization can affect income.
distribution in less developed and advanced countries.
Less developed countries are affected principally in two ways. First, they are able to export
more of their own goods (and to import more), and they can be expected to be recipients of direct
foreign  and  portfolio  investments  from  the  capital-rich  countries.  According  to  the  simple
version of the Hekschler-Ohlin-Samuelson  (HOS) model, less  developed  countries  will tend to
export  low-skill intensive products (because low-skill labor is their abundant factor and its price
will therefore  be low).  Similarly  and  for the same reasons  foreign  investors  will also tend to
invest  in  low-skill  intensive  processes.  Moreover  as  the  more  advanced  countries  have  an
advantage  in skill-intensive products and tend to export these, there should be also a reduction in
relative wages of highly-skilled workers in less developed countries. When we translate this into
what it should imply for income distribution, and approximate  the latter by the ratio between the
high-skill and low-skill wage, it appears that income inequality within the LDCs should go down.
Mirroring these developments,  income distribution  in more developed  countries  should become
more  unequal.  This  is directly  derived  from  price-equalization  theorem  in  its  most  abstract
formulation  (see  Freeman,  1995  and  caveats  therein),  and  is  argued,  for  example  in  Wood
(1995,  1999).
Moreover,  as  less  developed  countries  continue  their process  of modernization  which
implies improvement in educational  attainment, the relative supply of high-skill people increases
compared  to  the  low-skill  people  (although  not  to  the  extent  that  it  would  reverse  the
comparative  advantage  of the  country).  This  seems  to  further  reduce  the  wage  differences
between the high- and low-skilled workers  and to shrink  wage (and thus  income) distribution.
3Relative demand shifts occasioned by globalization would tend to favor less-skilled workers,  and
so do relative supply shifts brought about by better educational achievement.  2
What may be the offsetting elements?  There are,  at least, two. First, rather than looking at
globalization  through  HOS  lenses,  we may  look at it as  a Kuznets-type  process.  Suppose  that
instead of two types of labor (low- and high-skill)  we have three types of labor (low-, medium,
and high-skilled).  Globalization  may produce  movement  of labor  from low  wage  (agricultural
sectors)  where wage  differentiation  is minimal,  to medium-skill  sectors  (in urban  areas) where
wage differences  are larger.  Then,  even if the ratio between  the top and bottom  shrinks (as the
ratio  between  high-skill  and  low-skill  wage  becomes  smaller),  overall  wage  and  income
inequality might increase  simply because of the  greater wage  differentiation  in the middle.  In
conclusion,  the ratio between  the  average wages  for different  types of labor is not sufficient to
describe  what happens to the  distribution.  We need to  look at the  pattern of change  across the
entire distribution, and at the differences  in how wages of particular skills are distributed.
Second,  although wages  constitute,  even in developing nations, the  largest chunk of total
income,  there  are two  other  sources  that  affect income  inequality  significantly.  They  are self-
employment income (including home-consumption),  and capital (property)  income. The share of
self-employment  income  would  tend  to  go  down  as  people  move  from  basically  subsistence
agriculture,  to become  wage-workers.  The  importance  of capital  income  will  depend on what
happens  to  the  real  interest  rate,  whose  level  is,  in  turn,  dictated  by what  happens  in  rich
countries.  (This  is  particularly  so  in  an  era of globalization.)  Since  property  income  is  very
strongly  concentrated  among  the  top  income  classes,  that element  too  might  provide  a very
strong countervailing  force to decreasing inequality-much  greater in effect than a simple share
of capital income in total would imply.
3. Modeling  the channels of influence
In a very simple way, absolute income  level of i-th decile inj-th country  at time t can be
written as a function of an inequality parameter specific to the country (Ijt) and the mean income
of the country (mjt), both subscripted for time.
yut = f(Ij,mj)  (1)
The relative income of the i-th decile (normalized by the mean) is then
j  = g(Ijt)  (2)
Mit
2  different approach is proposed by political scientists. Rogowski (1987)  argues that economic oppeness favors
industrial concentration which in turn leads to more centralized collective bargaining.  The latter is associated with
low wage, and most likely, higher overall income inequality. According to this view, openness would have a
positive effect on inequality regardless of level of income although the link between industrial concertation and
collective bargaining makes more  sense in the cintext of advanced countries.
4The change in i-th decile relative income between the two time period becomes
A(1j  = h(AIj)  (3)
mi
We now allow for two possibilities which will represent the two ways in which we  test our
hypothesis of the  effect of the  globalization variables  on income distribution.  First, we assume
that level of  our inequality index depends  on levels of the variables  listed below,  and second,
that the change in the inequality index between two  time periods depends on the change in the
same variables.  The variables are:
(1)  two "standard"  globalization variables, namely openness (OPENj) measured as the sum
of exports  and  imports  in country's  GDP,  and direct  foreign investment  as  share  of
GDP (DFIj),
(2)  financial  depth  (FDj)  the  ratio  of  M2-to-GDP,  introduced  on  the  assumption  that
greater financial  depth should reduce  the importance of financial  constraint to borrow
for education,  and  thus  should  help  those  who  are  talented  but  lack  resources,  and
reduce inequality (see, for example, Li, Squire and Zhou, 1998),  and
(3)  an indicator of  democracy  (DEMJ), on the assumption that democratization,  through the
median  voter  hypothesis,  should  lead  to  a  reduction  in  inequality  (see  Gradstein,
Milanovic, Ying,  1999).
Financial  depth and  democracy  are  not  viewed  as  linked  with  globalization  even if one
might plausibly  entertain  such  a  view  too.  For  example,  one  can  regard  increasing  financial
depth, that is increasing monetization of the economy to proceed directly from better integration
of a country into the international  economy, and democratization occur too in response to greater
international  exchange  and simply due to  global political  trends.  However,  we view these two
variables  as  controls  for  the  "non-globalization  related"  part  of the  influence  on  income
distribution,  and orthogonal to  the globalization-proper  variables.  We introduce  them primarily
to avoid misspecification of the model. We then rewrite (2) and (3)  in the reduced form as
Yu  = T (OPENj,  DFII,  FDl,  DEMj)  (2a)
mjt
At)  - yi(AOPEN1,ADFI 1,AFDj,ADEM1)  (3a)
mj)
where  As of course represent  changes  between the two time periods,  yij = income  of i-th
decile  (deciles  go  from  the  poorest,  1, to  the  richest,  10), j-th  country;  AOPEN  = change  in
openness between  1985-91  and 1992-97; ADFI  = change in direct foreign investment as share of
GDP  over the  same two  periods,  AFD  =  change in financial  depth  (M2/GDP),  and ADEM  =
change in democracy over the same two periods. Of course, ten regressions  such as (2a) and (3a)
are estimated:  one for each decile.
5However, we need also to take into account the fact that the globalization variables will not
affect the share of a given decile the same regardless of the country and its level of development.
Consider  the  following  fact.  Increased  openness  and  direct  foreign  investments  will,  as  the
theory tell us, tend to benefit low-skilled  workers in poor countries since  it would be these low-
skill intensive  industries which would be both attractive  to  foreign investors and  likely to take
advantage  of export  opportunities.  Thus,  we would  expect  that  the  sign of  OPEN  and  DFI
variables will be positive among the bottom deciles in poor countries.  But for a rich country, the
situation  is  exactly  the reverse.  Openness  will mean  that it is the  low-skilled  workers  in rich
countries  that would be exposed  to increased  foreign competition (see  Wood,  1995);  such low-
skill intensive products  are unlikely to be exported by the rich  countries,  and we would expect
that sign of OPEN and DFI variables to be negative for low income deciles in rich countries. The
coefficients of two globalization variables  will therefore vary in function of income level of the
country.  Ideally,  of course,  the  coefficients  should vary in function of the skill composition  of
each income  decile and country's  income  level. However,  since we do not have information  on
who  exactly is in each  decile  and what  is the skill  composition  of people  per decile,  we shall
have to use country's income level as a sole determinant.
Thus, we can write for each decile:
yl Y  = f3o +  ,8  OPEN1 + /322(OPEN * mj) + /3DFIj + /34(DFI  * mj) + /3sFDj  + /I6DEMj  (2b)
mj
m  Yj)  = fib + 131 AOPENi + 132(AOPEN  *  mi)  + 133ADFIj + 34(ADFIj * mi) + ,/sAFDj  + fi4ADEMj
(3b)
As  for the  signs of P3  and  N4  associated with respectively  financial depth  and democracy,
we expect them to be positive among the low deciles, and negative among the higher deciles-on
the theory that lack of deep financial markets (inability to borrow against one's future income) is
bad  for  the  poor  and  for  equality  (see  Li,  Squire,  Zhao,  1997;  Becketty,  ),  and  that
democratization should likewise help the poor by leading to greater redistribution (see Gradstein,
Milanovic and Ying, 2000).
As  we indicated,  there  are  10  cross  sectional regressions  such as  (2b) and (3b);  one for
each  income  decile  run  across  all  countries.  In  other  words,  we  try  to  see  how  a  set  of
macroeconomic  changes  (on the RHS)  has affected  the relative  (to the  mean)  income  level of
each income decile.
4. Descriptive statistics
Before  trying  to  link  globalization  and  other  macro  variables  to  changes  in  income
distribution, we need to define variables  more precisely. For the distribution, we use the data on
$PPP incomes of each decile  for almost 90 countries  around  1988  (more exactly between  1985
6and  1991)  and  around  1993  (more  exactly  between  1992  and  1997).  All  RHS  variables  are
calculated as the averages over a period. There are two reasons for this rather than simply using a
single value  for 1988  or 1993.  First, the  distribution data are only "benchmarked"  in 1988  and
1993.  The actual  surveys which  we use  to derive the decile data might  have been conducted in
the years  around 1988 (say,  1986 or 1989).  The situation is the same for the year  1993. (For the
list of surveys, source of data etc. see Milanovic,  2002, Appendix 1).
Second,  even  if all  surveys  were  conducted  in  the  same  year,  there  would  be  some
advantage  in relating  changes  in mean  incomes  to, say,  several  years  average  share  of exports
and imports in GDP.  This in order to avoid having the results being swamped by very short run
changes.  Al  mentioned before,  globalization  is  reflected  in two  variables:  openness-share  of
combined exports  and imports in GDP-and  the share of direct  foreign investments in GDP of
the recipient country.  Openness  that is associated with income distribution around  1988  is taken
to  be  the  average  of exports  and  imports  over  GDP  during  the  period  1985-91  (openpre).
Openness that is associated with income distribution in 1993 is defined as the average over 1992-
97  period  (openpost). The  change in openness  is then obtained  as  openpost-openpre. Identical
calculations  are  done for direct  foreign investment,  M2/GDP,  and democracy variables,  except
that in a few cases (when the data were available),  the latter period extended up to 1998.
Table  1 shows mean-normalized  average  incomes  of each decile  in  1988  and  1993.  For
example, we see that on average  (calculated  across  88  countries  and without any weighting) in
1988,  the bottom decile's  income was  30.7 percent  of the mean.  By  1993,  the  bottom decile's
income was only 24.8 percent of the mean. Relative  incomes of the bottom  seven deciles  went
down-with the negative  change  the largest among the poor deciles-while the relative income
of the top three deciles went up, again with the greatest positive change among the top. Thus, for
example, on average people in the top decile in 1988 were having incomes that were 2.735 times
greater than  the  national  mean.  In  1993,  these  incomes  were  almost  3 times  greater  than  the
mean.  On a  cross-country  basis, we  observe  increased  inequality:  incomes  of the low deciles
have tended to be fall behind the mean income growth, incomes of the top to forge  ahead of the
mean.
Table  1.  Mean-normalized  average incomes of each decile
(across countries, not weighted for population)
1988  1993  Change
First  0.307  0.248  -0.059
Second  0.443  0.399  -0.044
Third  0.541  0.503  -0.039
Fourth  0.637  0.600  -0.037
Fifth  0.738  0.707  -0.031
Sixth  0.857  0.836  -0.021
Seventh  1.003  0.988  -0.014
Eighth  1.201  1.208  0.008
Ninth  1.538  1.577  0.039
Tenth  2.735  2.934  0.198
Total  1  1  0
7Note: based on 88 same countries in 1998 and 1993. Deciles  formed based on per capita income  or
expenditures (obtained from household surveys).
Table 2 shows the increase in the combined share of exports and imports in GDP over the
period  under study.  There  is  a sustained  increased  in the  (unweighted)  share  from  around  60
percent in the mid-1980's to almost 80 percent in the late  1990's.
Table 2. Share exports and imports in GDP
(unweighted; cross country)
Year  Number of countries  Average share of  Minimum  Maximum
openness  (in %)  (in %)
(in percent)
1985  69  62.3  14 (India)  209 (Hong Kong)
1986  70  59.9  14  214
1987  71  60.7  14  235
1988  71  62.2  15  257
1989  71  64.9  14  255
1990  71  65.8  14  260
1991  72  65.5  14  271
1992  79  64.1  15  281
1993  84  66.8  16  274
1994  86  70.6  17  278
1995  87  74.8  16  303
1996  86  74.4  16 (Brazil)  286 (Hong Kong)
1997  85  77.0  18 (Brazil)  264 (Cyprus)
1998  63  79.2  18 (Brazil)  250 (Hong Kong)
Source:  World Development Indicators;  World Bank. SIMA Database, World Bank.
The  increase  in  openness  was  registered  in  all  the  regions  except  the  most  developed
(WENAO) where it went down by 2.7 Gini points (Table 3).  It was by far the most significant
for the Asian economies whose openness increased by more than  15 GDP points on average.  For
49 countries  where openness  increased,  it did so by on average of 12.4  GDP points.  The most
significant increases were registered by Malaysia  (from 129 to 177 percent of GDP), Hong Kong
(from  243  to 281  percent),  Jamaica (from  108  to  139  percent),  and Paraguay  (from  64  to  98
percent). For 19 countries where openness went down, it did so by an average of 5.5  GDP points.
The  most  significant  decreases  were  for  Luxembourg  (from  155  to  100  percent  of GDP),
Switzerland  (from  83  to 75 percent),  and Peru (from 34 to 26 percent).  Openness  for several  of
the  largest  (by GDP)  countries  increased.  For example,  for the  US it increased  from  19 to  24
percent of GDP, for China,  from 28  to 40, for India, from  15 to 23,  from Brazil,  from  16 to  17
percent. But, on the other hand, for Japan, openness went down from 20 to 18 percent of GDP.
8Table 3. Openness (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP
(unweighted regional averages)
First period  Second period  Change in  No. of countries
(1985-91)  (1992-97)  openness
Africa  59.7  67.3  +7.6  12
Asia  61.5  77.0  +15.5  16
Latin America  54.4  64.5  +10.1  17
Transition economies  68.8  71.4  +2.6  3 in the first, 11
in the second
period
WENAO  72.0  69.3  -2.7  21
World  63.4  69.8  +6.4  69; 77
Even more dramatic were increases in foreign direct investments  as percentage  of GDPs of
the  recipient  countries  (Table  4).  The  unweighted  importance  of foreign  direct  investments
increased  from about  1.1 percent of GDP in  1985 to 5.6 percent in 1998. If we compare the first
(1985-91) and the second (1992-97) period, for 52 countries, the average share of DFI inflows  in
GDP  increased,  while  for  only  ten  countries  it  becamne  less  important.  In  seven  countries
(Lesotho,  Luxembourg,  Panama,  China,  Bolivia,  Hong  Kong,  and  Peru)  the  share  of direct
foreign investment in GDP in the second period exceeded by more than 5 GDP percentage points
the share in the first period. The most important increases  were registered in Lesotho (from 2.7 to
24  percent  of GDP),  and  Luxembourg  (from  66  to  81  percent  of  GDP).  For  China,  the
importance of DFI went up, over the same period, from an average of less than  1 percent of GDP
to more than 5  percent of GDP. In the US, DFIs increased  from 0.9  to 1 percent of GDP. India,
which started with almost no direct foreign investments, reached  some  1/2 one percent of GDP in
the second period.
9Table 4. Foreign direct investment as percentage of recipient
country's GDP (unweighted average)
Year  Number of  Percentage of GDP  Maximum a/
countries




1988  67  1.90  4.7 (Lesotho)
4.5 (Hong Kong)
1989  67  2.63  7.9 (Nigeria)
4.7 (Chile)
1990  69  2.42  6.2 (Zambia)
5.5 (Malaysia)
1991  71  2.35  8.5 (Malaysia)
4.7 (Belgium)
1992  82  2.27  8.8 (Malaysia)
5.2 (New Zealand)
1993  85  2.55  7.8 (Malaysia)
6.4 (China)
1994  86  3.08  36.0 (Lesotho)
7.1 (China)
1995  87  3.16  32.3 (Lesotho)
10.0 (Hungary)
1996  87  3.48  33.2 (Lesotho)
7.4 (Latvia)
1997  87  4.33  28.3 (Lesotho)
14.5  (Panama)
1998  86  5.63  33.1 (Lesotho)
13.2 (Panama)
a/  Luxembourg,  which in all years has the highest share of direct foreign investment in GDP (over 70
percent) is not shown.
Source:  UNCTAD Handbook ofInternational Trade and Development Statistics, 1996, 1997, 2000.
10Alike trade, the flow of direct foreign investment has increased  in all regions of the world
with the most significant unweighted increases  occurring in Africa and in transition  economies,
where in the first period, foreign investment was practically nil (Table 5).
Table 5. Direct foreign investment as percentage of GDP
(unweighted regional averages)
First period  Second period  Change in DFI  No. of countries
(1985-91)  (1992-98)
Africa  1.3  3.9  +2.6  11
Asia  1.0  2.2  +1.2  14; 16
Latin America  0.9  3.0  +2.1  16
Transition economies  0.1  2.3  +2.1  1;  15
WENAO  4.4  5.7  +1.3  22
World  2.1  3.6  +1.5  64; 80
We  are less  interested  in the  other two  control  variables,  financial  depth (M2/GDP)  and
democracy.  The former is measured in a straight-forward  fashion, as the ratio of M2 to GDP (see
Table  7).  The  latter  is  measured  by  the  Executive  and  Legislative  Index  of  Electoral
Competitiveness,  a variable from the Database of Political Institutions (DBI) developed by Beck,
Clarke, Groff, Keefer,  and Walsh (2000).  Indexes'  values range from 1-least democratic-to  7
-most democratic (see Table 8).
Table 7. M2 as percentage of GDP
(unweighted regional averages)
First period  Second period  Change in  No. of countries
(1985-91)  (1992-97)  M2/GDP
Africa  46  39  -7  11;10
Asia  58  78  +20  13;14
Latin America  31  35  +4  17
Transition economies  44  40  -4  2; 4
WENAO  61  65  +4  15
World  48  53  -5  58;60
Source:  World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Democracy as  proxied by an index of competitiveness  in  legislative  elections  (LEEC)  and
in the election of chief executive (EEEC)  shows  an increase in all the regions (except in WENAO
where it was already at the maximum).  The most important increases were registered, of course,
in  the  transition  countries.  It  is  interesting  that  only  four  countries  show  a  deterioration  in
democracy  between  the  two  periods  as  estimated  by  LIEC  (Algeria,  Indonesia,  Mexico  and
Thailand), and only three countries as estimated by EIEC (Jordan,  Thailand and Uganda).
11Table 8. Democracy proxied by the Legislative and Executive hidex of
Electoral  Competitiveness (LEC and EIEC)
(unweighted regional averages)
First period  Second period  Change  Number  of
(1985-91)  (1992-97)  countries
LIEC  EIEC  LEEC  EIEC  LIEC  EIEC
Africa  4.1  3.5  4.9  4.6  +0.8  +0.9  12;11
Asia  5.4  5.0  6.3  5.5  +0.9  +0.5  12
Latin America  6.7  6.6  6.9  6.9  +0.2  0  17
Transition economies  3.4  3.2  6.4  5.9  +3.0  +2.7  17;  15
WENAO  7.0  7.0  7.0  7.0  0  0  22
World  5.5  5.3  6.5  6.2  +1.0  +0.9  80;77
Source: Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness  and Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness
from Database  of  Political  Institutions (DBI).  Both indexes range from 1  (least competitive)  to 7 (most
competitive).  For explanation how the indexes are derived, see Beck et al. (2000).
5. Estimation of the regressions
Next we estimate the two types (level and change) of regressions:
- = ,Bo + 8  i OPEN 1 + /32(OPEN  * mj) +  B3 DFIj  + /34(DFI  * mj) + ,13sFDj  + /36DEMj  (2b)
mj
A( YM'j=  Po + Piu AOPENj + fi2(AOPEN * mi) + JJ3ADFIj + 834(ADFIj * my) + 8IsAFDj + /34ADEMj  (3b)
where  all the variables  and coefficients  are as  already explained.  There are  10  such cross
sectional  regressions  under  each  specification:  one  for  each  income  decile  run  across  all
countries. The results are shown in Tables 1-4. 3
The first (levels)  regression is a pooled cross-section  equation run across  88 countries  for
which  we have  decile  data  in  1988  and  1993.  As can  be  seen  in  Table  1, for bottom  seven
deciles, openness  is negatively related with their income share.  However,  that negative  effect is
lessened  for  richer  countries  as  the  interaction  term  between  openness  and  mean  income  is
positive.  Openness would therefore  seem to have a particularly negative impact on the poor and
the middle-income  groups in poor countries-which  is directly opposite to what we would have
expected  based on theory.  It  is only  when income  level  leaches  $5,000-$6,000  in purchasing
power terms, that is around the income level of the Czech republic, Colombia or Chile, that for
3  We allow for possibility that income level may influence relative income shares in equation (2b) and introduce
mean household survey  income and mean squared income.  However, neither variables is significant.
12the poor (the bottom three deciles) openness becomes  a "good thing"-that is, raises their share
in total income.
Note also  that the turning point (positive  impact  of openness) takes place  earlier for the
middle  and  higher  income  deciles.  For  example,  the  share  of the  seventh  decile  is  favorably
affected when  overall mean income reaches  about  $3,900 (slightly above the level of Panama).
For the top two deciles,  openness  exerts the  opposite effect.  It particularly  raises the income of
the rich in poor countries,  and its positive effect on the rich is reduced as mean income increases.
For mean  income  levels  around  $5,000-$6,000,  the impact of openness  on  income  share of the
rich becomes negative.
The results of the level  regression  thus suggest an almost Kuznets-like effect of openness
on income distribution. When a country is relatively poor, increased openness raises the income
share of the top, and reduces the income  share of the poor groups as well as of the middle class.
(We are throughout talking of "shares", not absolute incomes.) However,  at some medium-level
of income ($5-6,000 per capita based on Household survey data),  income  share of the poor and
the middle class begin to be positively  affected by openness while the income  share of the rich
begins to decline.  Finally, for the rich countries,  openness is associated with increasing share of
the  bottom  and middle  deciles,  and decreasing  share  of the top  deciles.  Openness thus  helps
income distribution  chart an inverted U shape  as income  level increases.  At low income levels,
openness is bad for equality;  at medium and high income level it promotes equality.
This  suggests  that only  the  middle-income  countries  behave  as  the  rigorous  version  of
theory would imply. But poor countries whose  equality  should be helped  by openness,  and the
rich countries where openness should increase income differentials, behave in the exactly reverse
fashion than we would expect.  However, these results  are consistent with those posited by Wood
(1994).  In his model, poor countries  that open up may experience  increased  inequality because
there  are three types of labor,  and the openness  helps those  with basic  and  high education, but
reduces  the income  share of those with no education (they fall  further behind).  It is only when
basic education becomes the norm-and even the poor have it-that openness exert an income-
equalizing  effect.  This is what we might be picking up in resuts  which show at  some middling
level of income ($5-6,000),  the share of the lower and middle  income classes begins  to rise.  As
Wood  (1994)  writes,  a  strategy based  on  exports  of manufactures  that  require  at  least  basic
education would be equitable in Korea but inequitable in Burkina Faso or Pakistan  (quoted from
Kanbur,  1998).
Direct  foreign  investments  (as  a  share  of country's  GDP),  or  financial  depth  are  not
significant  in any regression.  Democracy, proxied by the way that the country's chief executive
is elected,  is shown to be negatively  associated with income  share of the poor and the middle
class, and positively associated with income share of the top decile.  A one point increase in thus
measured democracy (from,  say the level of Ghana to that of Indonesia) lowers the income share
of the poorest decile by 0.2 percent (of total income) and raises the share of the top decile by 1.3
percent  of total  income.  However,  when we  proxy  democracy  by the  level  of democracy  in
election of legislature (national  Parliament) the effect disappears-there  is neither a positive nor
negative effect. The variable is not statistically significant from zero.
13Regressions  in  Table  2  are  the  same  as  in  Table  1 except  that  we  now  add  regional
dummies-thus  assuming  that  there  are  specific  regional  intercept  effects.  While  openness
variable  is not affected,  interaction between  openness and mean income  is, as  some of its effect
seems  to  be  taken  over  by  the  regional  variables.  In  Asia,  Eastern  Europe  and  WENAO
countries,  regional  dummies  offset  to  a  large  extent  the  negative  effect  of openness  on  low
income  deciles.  In Eastern  Europe and WENAO openness  appears  to  help the poor deciles;  in
Asia,  it does not affect them,  while now only in Africa  and Latin  America  openness  hurts  the
poor.  We  are  not  surprised  by the  results  for  WENAO  countries  because  they  were  already
implied  in our earlier  finding  (from  Table  1) that  at  a relatively  high income  level,  openness
increases income shares of the poor and the middle class. However,  in Africa and Latin America,
openness  increases  inequality at low  income levels.  The other variables  show no change  except
that the importance of democracy declines.
The  results  in  Tables  1  and  2  were  obtained  by  running  the  decile  regressions
independently,  one  by  one.  This  is,  however,  a  simplification  because  income  shares  are
determined simultaneously.  By running the decile regressions as a simultaneous  system (leaving
aside one  decile in  order to  avoid orthogonality),  we  also  avoid the inconsistency  of having a
possibility of an RI-S variable affecting  all shares negatively or positively. This is done in  Table
3.  The results  show that openness  is still negatively  associated with income of low  and middle
income deciles, and positively with relative income of the rich.  The turning point (positive effect
of openness)  for the bottom three deciles occurs at around $PPP 5-6,000, for the middle deciles
around  $PPP 4-5,000. At about the  same income level,  the rich (top two deciles)  who initially
benefited  from openness  begin  to  lose  (in  relative  terms).  DFI  and  its  interaction  with mean
income still remain insignificant, while democracy is strongly pro-rich.
When we move (in Table 4) to look at the effect of the same variables  on change in decile
shares between  1988 and  1993,  the results change. No  variable is now shown to be  statistically
significant.  The impact of our variables on changes in shares is apparently much more difficult to
detect-possibly because the time period under consideration was short.
14Table  1. Explaining mean-normalized  decile incomes (1988,1993)
(regressions run independently;  dependent variable: decile income/mean income)
First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth
Openness  -0.108  .-0.203  .- 0.194  - '-0.l7,7;,  . -0.155  - -0416''  -0.027  0.127 ,--  1-e-.037e,-'
,(-0.0093  (0.000) . (0.000)(  (0f.000)-  '(0040).000,  ,  (0.00-1)O1  (0.427)  (0.030)  (0.000)
and  mean income  level  (  ~~~~0.000)  0)  (0.00  (0.000)  -(0,60
Interaction of openness  000002  0.0003'  0004  0.00004-.  0.00003  0,00003  o000.03,  .00001  . -0.00  02o ;0'0021-
(O'.O00~  (0  (0.000),  fb.000)0  (O.006)  (0~.003  -- (0.00)6 and  mea nincome level  W(e°?(  .- ;-(f°-°e-%0)  oo  o,  (o0  o  o  3.)  ;  0.000) 
DFI  -0.452  -0.298  -0.283  -0.451  -0.480  -0.497  -0.420  -0.102  0.296  2.687
(0.374)  (0.585)  (0.593)  (0.395)  (0.332)  (0.282)  (0.338)  (0.812)  (0.682)  (0.396)
Interaction of DFI  0.00003  0.000004  0.000001  0.00001  0.00002  0.00002  0.00001  -0.000004  -0.00001  -0.00007
and income level  (0.452)  (0.921)  (0.975)  (0.716)  (0.641)  (0.625)  (0.686)  (0.880)  (0.826)  (0.739)
Financial depth  -0.00008  -0.00148  -0.00234  -0.00258  -0.00227  -0.00086  -0.00055  0.00048  0.00351  0.00616
(0.983)  (0.702)  (0.533)  (0.492)  (0.518)  (0.792)  (0.859)  (0.874)  (0.493)  (0.783)
Democracy  (EIEC)  F  -0.021.8  '0201  -- 0.0188  -0.0178-O-0.0T65--.6  0146 7z0013t]  -0.0106  0.0033  -:0 .1301<-
po.ol  O00i)  '0(0d006)  '(0.009)  (0.009)  -,  ,'(013  , (0-.019)  (0.052)  (0.718)  .(0.001)
Transition  0.114  0.167-  0.185  0.183  '  0.172  0.149,  0.112,  -0052  -0.130'  -1.004 
Dummy  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  .0.001)  ,(0.101)  (0.Q17)  (0.000)
Constant  0.371,  .'0.519  0.621  0.716  6.811;  0,921  '  1.061,,  1.250  1.550-  2.180'  ,
(0.'000)  (0.000).  (0.000)  (.0  (.0  (O0O"00)  .(000)'  .^ (0000)  -(0.00) - (0.000).
R2 Adjusted  0.21  0.345  0.3966  0.3911  0.3977  0.3871  0.2925  0.0539  0.0973  0.3676
Fstatistics  5.25  9.43  11.51  11.28  11.57  11.1  7.61  1.91  2.72  10.3
Noofobs.  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113
15Table 2. Explaining mean-normalized decile incomes (1988,1993)
(regressions run independently; with regional dummy variables;  dependent variable: decile income/mean income)
First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth
Openness  -0.060  . - 3  -. 2  -0.032  0.031  0.100  I.t0
(0.115)  .0  -0  1  0  )  . (0.322)  (0.369)  (0.114)  %  2
Interaction of  0.00001  0.00002  0.0000  2  00i  0.00001  0.00001  0.00000  0.00000  -0.00002  -0.00006
openness and  mean  (0.319)  (007)  . )  (  (0.059)  (0.216)  (0.733)  (0.481)  (0.155)  (0.137)
income level
Asia dummy  . _  'KO!  "  1]  0.9  _  0.028  -0.022  -0.119 
=0.000~  ~~o~o:o~  ~  (0.00.5  (0024)  (0.317)  (0.463)  (0.029)  (
Latin America  -0.039  -0.039  -0.034  -0.035  -0.038  -0.041  -0.051  -0.060  -0.040  0.377
dummy  (0.252)  (0.292)  (0.339)  (0.334)  (0.255)  (0.169)  (0.083)  (0.054)  (0.478)  (0.066)
Eastem  Europe  1  0  2  . O  0  9  7  0.027  1  _
FSU dummy  (  . . 0f  i  (  (  (0.02  (0.454)  (.i
WENAO  dummy  0.  .8  0  2  3  0 1  042  0.064  -0.097
(0.049)  (  (  0(0.109)  (0.179)-
DFI  -0.386  -0.264  -0.275  -0.467  -0.537  -0.608  -0.586  -0.291  0.158  3.256
(0.371)  (0.572)  (0.545)  (0.313)  (0.206)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.464)  (0.826)  (0.211)
Interaction of  0.00003  0.00001  0.00001  0.00003  0.00003  0.00004  0.00004  0.00002  -0.00001  -0.0002
DFI and mean  (0.298)  (0.696)  (0.688)  (0.409)  (0.271)  (0.173)  (0.167)  (0.556)  (0.883)  (0.277)
income
Financial depth  0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0009  -0.0001  0.0019  0.0024  0.0028  0.0032  -0.008
(0.930)  (0.892)  (0.797)  (0.797)  (0.975)  (0.490)  (0.368)  (0.336)  (0.536)  (0.657)
Democracy  (EIEC)  -0.015  -0.014  -0.013  -0.012  -0.010  -0.006  0.007  -9
-~0.00v  (0.058)  . (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.085)  (0.321)  (0.547)  (1048
Constant  0.298  0.444  0.550  0.648  0.749  0.865  1.019  1.230  1.592  2.605
16(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.O00(  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Noofobs  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113
F Stat  9.88  13.45  15.57  14.55  15.71  16.77  12.45  3.91  2.58  16.56
R2 adjusted  0.4422  0.5265  0.5654  0.5475  0.5677  0.5847  0.5055  0.2063  0.1237  0.5815
17Table 3. Explaining mean-normnalized  decile incomes (1988,1993)
(regressions estimated simultaneously;  dependent variable: decile income/mean income)
First  Second  Third  Fourth  Sixth  Seventh  Ei  hth  Ninth  Tenth
Openness  -- !-  i1  44  Xj  O7  ,  g
Initeraction of  0002  .003  oo(~  'b  OiT~  * 
openness and mean  . (  m  . - X  X 7
income  I~.
DFI  -0.515  -0.390  -0.385  -0.553  -0.579  -0.482  -0.131  0.368  3.242
(.311)  (.489)  (.492)  (.323)  (.228)  (.277)  (.754)  (.606)  (.325)
Interaction of DFI  0.00003  0.00001  0.00001  0.00002  0.00002  0.00002  -0.000002  -0.00002  -0.0001
and mean income  (.364)  (.762)  (.795)  (.566)  (.493)  (.565)  (.947)  (.726)  (.593)
Financial depth  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.0002  -0.019
(.422)  (.477)  (.544)  (.591)  (.378)  (.454)  (.527)  (.963)  (.393)
Democracy (EtEC)  0.  a  z  ij  0  004  0
(~~000)  (.00'3  . 0~5)'('~  (~~01,P)  ~  ~  ~  ~"O3'9'~'  (.658)  ."  00'
Constant  3  05  0  0 '  X  X
Noofobs  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113
Pseudo "R-sq"  0.195  0.285  0.314  0.309  0.321  0.261  0.090  0.106  0.303
18Table 4. Explaining decile incomes change between  1988 and  1993
(regressions run simultaneously;  dependent variable ; dependent  variable: A(decile income/mean income))
First  Second  Third  Fourth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth
Aopenness  -0.077  -0.087  -0.050  -0.042  0.011  -0.001  -0.200  -0.336  0.787
(.406)  (.384)  (.617)  (.654)  (.901)  (.991)  (.052)  (.074)  (.217)
Interaction of change in  0.00002  0.00002  0.000008  0.000002  -0.00001  -0.000007  -0.00002  -0.00005  0.00005
openness and mean income  (.524)  (.639)  (.806)  (.958)  (.727)  (.791)  (.492)  (.365)  (.789)
ADFI  -0.219  -0.189  -0.247  -0.351  -0.324  -0.001  0.375  0.735  0.465
(.654)  (.719)  (.637)  (.470)  (.484)  (.998)  (.486)  (.455)  (.889)
Interaction of change in  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0013
DFI and mean income  (.381)  (.415)  (.376)  (.351)  (.294)  (.649)  (.840)  (.472)  (.541)
A Financial depth  -0.028  -0.012  -0.048  -0.084  -0.149  -0.167  -0.144  -0.098  0.872
(.661)  (.863)  (.494)  (.195)  (.015)  (.003)  (.045)  (.456)  (.049)
A democracy (EIEC)  -0.0005  0.0007  -0.0010  -0.0018  -0.0009  -0.0055  0.0033  0.0092  0.0006
(.944)  (.930)  (.891)  (.795)  (.894)  (.366)  (.672)  (.521)  (.990)
Constant  -0.009  -0.006  -0.006  -0.004  -0.001  0.004  -0.054
(.379)  (.594)  (.580)  (.679)  (.881)  (.656)  (.452)
No of obs  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45
"R-sq"  0.068  0.062  0.057  0.083  0.162  0.203  0.379  0.316  0.230
196. Conclusions
The effects  of globalization  on  income distribution  within  rich  and  poor countries  are  a
matter of controversy.  While international  trade  theory in its most abstract  formulation  implies
that increased trade  and foreign  investment should make income distribution more equal in poor
countries  and less equal in rich countries,  finding these effects has proved elusive.
Here  we have  tried to  discern  the  effects of globalization  by using data  from  household
surveys  and by looking at  the  impact of openness  (combined  share  of exports  and imports  in
country's  GDP) and direct  foreign investment  as a share of country's  GDP, on  relative  income
shares of low and high deciles. We find  some evidence that at a very low income  level, it is the
rich who benefit from openness. As income level rises, that is for countries like Colombia,  Chile
or Czech republic,  the situation changes and the relative income of the poor and the middle class
rises compared to the rich (top deciles).  It seems that openness makes income distribution worse
before  making  it  better-or  differently  that  the  effect  of  openness  on  country's  income
distribution depends on country's initial income level.
These  results  run  counter  to  simple  factor-price  equalization  theory  with  two  types  of
labor.  They  are  however  consistent  with a  view propounded  by Wood  (1994)  that,  with three
types of labor (no  education,  basic,  and highly skilled),  openness  in very poor countries  might
increase inequality by helping those with basic education,  and leaving even further behind those
with  no  education.  Only  when  at  least  basic  education  becomes  the  norm,  can  even  the  poor
deciles (consisting of people with basic education)  share benefits of incresed labor demand; then
inequality falls.
When we introduce  regional dummy variables,  they tend to override  the effect  of income
level.  Thus,  openness  seems  to  be  associated  with  improved  equality  in  rich  countries  and
transition economies, not to have much of an effect in Asia, and to be associated with worsening
inequality in Latin America and Africa.
We do not find any significant  effect of direct foreign investment  on income distribution.
Finally, when these same variables are used not in the level form, but as first difference (change)
between  1988 and  1993, to  explain changes  in income  shares between the two  same dates,  the
results are very weak: we fail to find any significant impact.
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